自20世纪90年代以来,我国东北地区的经济增速明显低于全国平均水平。本文从产业结构转型的视角出发,对“东北现象”进行分析,解释东北地区经济增长相对缓慢的原因。本文认为,东北地区经济增长缓慢的背后是产业结构转型的迟缓和停滞,这既包括从农业部门向非农部门的结构转型,也包括制造业内部不同资本密集度行业之间的结构变化。在改革开放初期,东北地区的农业劳动生产率明显高于其他地区,这使东北地区错过了由符合我国总体比较优势的外向型劳动密集型产业快速扩张带来的经济增长。本文发现,上述农业劳动生产率假说可以在很大程度上解释1990～2010年东北地区人均GDP增速低于全国平均水平的现象。同时,本文还进一步通过与川渝地区的对比强化了对核心假说的论证,并对东北地区2010年之后经济增长相对缓慢的原因进行了探究。

中国快速城市化过程中的城市收缩问题,不仅是一个人口流失问题,而且是资本和劳动力要素在城市层面进行配置后的结果。本文从“资源错配”新视角出发,利用2010～2019年287个地级市及以上的数据,系统分析了中国收缩城市和非收缩城市的资源配置情况,并且结合城市的地理区位、资源禀赋、产业结构升级以及城市行政等级情况进行了交互分析,研究发现:首先,城市收缩确实与资源在城市层面的配置有关,收缩城市的资源错配问题更加严重,而且收缩城市既存在资本配置过剩,也存在劳动力配置过剩。其次,从资源错配的角度有助于深入理解中国城市收缩在不同地区并存出现的现象,中西部是资本配置过剩问题,而东北则是劳动力配置过剩问题。最后,对于收缩城市而言,资本配置在东部、中部和西部全部过剩,劳动力配置则在东部和中部不足而在西部过剩;资本在非资源型城市的配置过剩更加严重,而劳动力在资源型城市的配置过剩更加严重;产业结构高级化水平低城市的资源错配程度要比产业结构高级化水平高的城市更严重;低等级城市的资源错配程度要比高等级城市更严重。本文对于中国解决城市收缩、城市可持续发展以及城市资源配置等问题富有启发意义。解决中国城市收缩问题是一个系统工程,需要根据不同城市的地理区位、资源禀赋、产业升级能力以及城市等级等因素,合理优化资本和劳动力这两种要素的配置。

消费中心(城市)是中国特色的经济概念。可以预见,如同我国生产中心的发展,带动形成强大的国内生产供给体系,我国消费中心的发展,也将带动形成强大的国内消费市场体系,促进国内经济大循环。随着国际消费中心城市在我国开始试点,未来中国各省份围绕消费中心的竞争必定越来越激烈。作为一项大的消费经济、区域经济、宏观经济、世界经济政策举措,消费中心有着其内在的促内循环机制,具体包括通过提升区域消费动能加速内循环的动力机制、通过延展区域消费容量扩大内循环的扩容机制、通过强化区域消费供给能力做强内循环的消费供给机制、通过扩充区域消费资源夯实内循环的资源基础机制、通过提高区域消费品质升级内循环的内涵深化机制、通过多样化区域消费产品体系完备内循环的外延扩展机制。无论是对于消费经济发展、区域经济发展,还是对于内需刺激、宏观调控、国际经济协作,这些机制都具有重要意义,需要完善相关配套政策。

本文深入剖析地缘政治、贸易冲突与全球价值链（GVC）重构的内在关联，在地缘政治和贸易冲突的双重视角下考察GVC重构的底层逻辑与演化方向，得出以下结论。首先，制度性冲突已深度嵌入GVC，诸边联合博弈左右GVC重构进程和方向，GVC重构经由投入产出关联放大贸易冲突和大国博弈的负面影响。其次，利益分配失衡加剧GVC选择性“脱钩”“制造业回流”推动贸易和投资规则重组、贸易动力模式进入新旧转换通道成为GVC重构的驱动因素，促使GVC开始重构，而地缘政治风险和国家安全目标、技术性贸易摩擦常态化、公平贸易与价值观贸易盛行则成为GVC加速重构的催化剂。未来，主动需求协同被动应对推动GVC重构愈加泛化、全球价值链非市场变化凸显主权化趋向、自主创新成为GVC攀升的主要驱动因素。最后，中国应贯彻落实创新立国战略，通过超大国内市场规模加快推动本土核心技术创新，坚持以市场吸引“逆向创新”，加强价值链、产业链、供应链的安全保障体系顶层设计，利用好进出口两面市场，与主流国家加强交流。本文扩展了从外部动力视角探究GVC重构的研究内涵，对贸易高质量发展和破解“低端锁定”困境具有政策启示。

在数字经济时代，乡村振兴需要数字技术提供引擎和发展动力。农村电商作为数字经济融入中国农村的重要形式，对农民收入的影响如何？本文采用2012～2018年的地级市面板数据，利用淘宝村出现的时空差异构建双重差分模型评估农村电商对农民收入的影响。研究发现，“地级市内有无淘宝村”“地级市内淘宝村数量”均具有显著的增收效应。对于一个淘宝村数量处于平均数（18个）的地级市来说，其农民年均可支配收入比没有淘宝村的地级市高642元，相当于农民年均可支配收入平均值的5%；此外，淘宝村使得农民消费支出提高315元，相当于农民年均可支配收入平均值的2.4%，有利于推动经济内循环。异质性分析发现，淘宝村对初始农业生产率低、城镇潜在市场大的地区的影响更大。机制检验发现，淘宝村的增收效应主要源于对创业的拉动作用。本文结论表明农村电商可以激发农村地区的经济活力和内生增长动力，是全面推进乡村振兴的重要抓手。

中国式现代化是中国共产党领导的社会主义现代化,既有各国现代化的共同特征,更有基于自己国情的中国特色。本文在全面深入学习党的二十大精神的基础上,以中国式现代化为中心议题贯穿新中国成立以来的历届党代会报告、历年政府工作报告和历次五年规(计)划,围绕“为什么做、怎么做、做了什么、未来如何做”四个问题展开。全面阐释“中国式现代化”提出的时代背景、中国特色社会主义现代化实践的发展历程以及新时代中国特色社会主义现代化建设的战略举措,遵循“让数据讲好中国故事”的原则,从人口规模巨大的现代化、全体人民共同富裕的现代化、物质文明和精神文明相协调的现代化、人与自然和谐共生的现代化以及走和平发展道路的现代化等维度选取22个指标,结合非平衡面板数据量化分析中国式现代化的实践历程与重大成就。历史数据显示,新中国成立以来,中国特色社会主义现代化建设持续推进,在物质文明、社会文明、精神文明、生态文明和大同文明等领域取得一系列显著成就,打破了现代化只属于西方资本主义的神话。历史经验表明,中国共产党对人民是信守承诺的,对发展是锐意进取的,对政策是延续不断的,对自然是和谐共生的,对世界是命运与共的;中国式现代化必须从自己国情出发,以人民为中心,坚持中国共产党的领导,将系统观念一以贯之。总之,中国式现代化顺应了全国人民所需和世界发展之变,以中国式现代化全面推进中华民族伟大复兴必将成功。

为实现党的二十大擘画的宏伟蓝图,需要努力建构中国自主知识体系。中国经济学学科体系已有100多年的历史,历经了四个阶段。构建中国特色经济学学科体系的价值取向应坚持以马克思主义为指导、坚持以人民为中心、坚持以服务中国实践为基点、坚持问题导向、坚持传承前人学说和坚持各门经济学科的融会协调;提高中国经济学学科的学术水平需要解决好学术概念、经济原理、历史知识、文献整理和学术争鸣等问题;提高中国经济学学科的话语权,应以讲好中国故事为基点,在内容、方式和传导上发力。

高质量发展是中国式现代化的本质要求,是全面建设社会主义现代化国家的首要任务。基于“技术—经济”研究范式,即技术革命引致经济变革,探讨中国经济高质量发展的路径,涵盖“三个变革”,即动力变革、效率变革、质量变革。其中,动力变革包括“五个根本转向”:从要素驱动转向创新驱动、从传统要素转向数据要素、从实体空间转向虚拟空间、从物理基础设施转向数字基础设施、从物质资本投资转向人力资本投资;效率变革包括“三个精准连接”:微观层面研发、制造、营销、营运四个区段精准连接,中观层面创新链、产业链、供应链、价值链四个链条精准连接,宏观层面生产、分配、交换、消费四个环节精准连接;质量变革包括“三个深度融合”:微观层面生产者和消费者深度融合、中观层面实体经济和虚拟经济深度融合、宏观层面有为政府和有效市场深度融合。在“新技术群”的加持下,在动力变革的基础上,通过效率变革和质量变革,实现中国经济高质量发展和高速度增长相统一的新型发展模式。

2022年,在世界格局加速演变、乌克兰危机升级、全球通胀升温、美联储货币政策剧烈调整等复杂多变的外部环境下,面对国内疫情反复和“三重压力”等挑战,中国经济在压力中迎难而进,总体呈现V型走势。2023年是全面贯彻落实党的二十大精神的开局之年,是实施“十四五”规划承前启后的关键一年,也是全面建设社会主义现代化国家开局起步的重要一年,做好经济工作具有重要意义。2023年,宏观政策需继续保持足够的逆周期调节力度,促进经济恢复更加稳固、更加充分,推动经济运行整体好转。建议积极的财政政策要加力提效,进一步优化工具选项,有效对冲私人部门需求不足缺口,促进产出缺口收敛;稳健的货币政策要精准有力,进一步发挥好总量和结构双重功能,为实体经济降低融资成本和减轻债务负担;提质加力就业优先政策,推动解决结构性就业矛盾;同时,要注重加强各类政策之间协调配合。加大财政货币政策对产业升级和科技创新的支持力度,形成推动高质量发展的合力。建议2023年抓好以下重点工作任务:一是因时因势优化疫情防控措施,更好统筹疫情防控和经济社会发展;二是稳定预期提振市场主体信心,着力扩大民间投资和居民消费;三是在化解风险的同时构建长效机制,促进房地产市场健康平稳发展;四是加快完善科技创新体系,提升国家创新体系效能;五是增强产业链供应链韧性,提高现代化水平和国际竞争力;六是加快重点领域改革攻坚步伐,深化对外开放应对外部挑战;七是深入推进区域协调发展和新型城镇化,增强城乡区域发展平衡性协调性;八是积极稳妥推进碳达峰碳中和,促进经济社会发展绿色转型;九是着力稳定重点群体就业,促进城乡居民收入增长;十是统筹发展与安全,做好重点领域风险防范化解工作。

如何理解产权塑造及其对市场发育的影响是经济学的核心话题，然而相应的经验证据并不充分。本文使用一套基于中国雷州半岛独特“祖宗地”现象的调查数据，对于农地制度演化如何塑造产权进而影响市场发育进行了探讨。首先考察样本村庄的土地制度演化史，通过提炼制度特征得到四类制度代表型：湄潭实验组、全国典型组、良序拟私有制组、失序拟私有制组。其次，使用一个政府管制与自发秩序权衡的理论框架，分析四类不同制度演化所塑造的产权状态。最后，实证研究结果表明，产权稳定性确实是政府管制和自发秩序互动的结果，为二者的力量权衡所塑造；产权清晰性却是政府管制的单调函数，即越管制越清晰；产权清晰性对于土地流转市场范围的扩大具有支撑作用；产权稳定性对于土地流转市场的深化而言必不可少。

自20世纪90年代以来,我国东北地区的经济增速明显低于全国平均水平。本文从产业结构转型的视角出发,对“东北现象”进行分析,解释东北地区经济增长相对缓慢的原因。本文认为,东北地区经济增长缓慢的背后是产业结构转型的迟缓和停滞,这既包括从农业部门向非农部门的结构转型,也包括制造业内部不同资本密集度行业之间的结构变化。在改革开放初期,东北地区的农业劳动生产率明显高于其他地区,这使东北地区错过了由符合我国总体比较优势的外向型劳动密集型产业快速扩张带来的经济增长。本文发现,上述农业劳动生产率假说可以在很大程度上解释1990～2010年东北地区人均GDP增速低于全国平均水平的现象。同时,本文还进一步通过与川渝地区的对比强化了对核心假说的论证,并对东北地区2010年之后经济增长相对缓慢的原因进行了探究。

Market-oriented reform is the mainstream of China’s economic reform and basic force for sustainable economic growth. In the process of China’s marketization reform, there has always been a prominent phenomenon that the market-oriented reform process of factor market lags behind that of the product market, which named as China’s asymmetric marketization reform. Chinese scholars argue that this phenomenon is the unreasonable intervention or control of Chinese governments at different levels, which has led to the imbalance and distortion of market supply and demand in key factor markets, distorting the pricing mechanism of key factors and resulting in a negative effect on China’s economic development. Based on the typical facts of the market-oriented reform and regional economic development level, this paper constructs a partial static equilibrium model, and proposes that the lag of factor marketization relative to product marketization would lead to the decline of the enterprise’s ability to obtain profits, and weaken the enterprise’s innovation investment.

To test above hypothesis, this paper uses a reasonable instrumental variable of the asymmetric marketization effect in China’s provinces and regions. From a historical point of view, this paper constructs instrumental variable by using the proportion of the employment of Chinese owned and collective enterprises in the labor force of provinces in 1978. First, we found that the robustness experience obtained from the micro enterprise level of the manufacturing sector in this paper is that China’s asymmetric marketization reform had a signifi cant inhibitory effect on the innovation investment of micro enterprises. More specifi cally, every one percentage increase in the lag of the factor marketization relative to the product marketization would cause the per capita total innovation investment and per capita private innovation investment of manufacturing enterprises to decrease by 1.200 and 1.202 percentage points respectively. Second, compared with other ownership enterprises, the innovation investment of state-owned enterprises would not be affected by the inhibitory effect of asymmetric marketization reform. Third, relative to R&D outsourcing, asymmetric marketization reform has a more significant inhibitory effect on independent innovation in China. Forth, asymmetric marketization reform has a signifi cant inhibitory effect on both technology import and reabsorption. Last, the mechanism analysis reveals that the inhibitory effect is mainly caused by the high monopoly price squeezing the profit of the industrial sector that resulted by the government’s intervention or control of the factor market. In addition, this paper also tests the alternative hypothesis. Some scholars believe that China’s asymmetric market-oriented reform would lead to adverse selection and moral hazard behavior in the process of innovation factor resource allocation, and inhibit the innovation activities of enterprises. It finds that in areas where asymmetric marketization is more serious, the provision of government innovation subsidies can promote the innovation investment of enterprises in the region.

It is considered that the paper added a value to existing literature in follow two aspects. First, it explores how the asymmetric marketization between the process of factor market and product market affect the enterprise’s innovation investment. Second, it reveals that the asymmetric marketization would squeeze the profit obtained from production. Third, the potential direction of China’s market-oriented reform in the long run is to accelerate the measures to promote the reform in key factors market and promote the market-reform of factor prices by realizing the free fl ow of factors.

China is experiencing a critical stage of accelerated urbanization. The acceleration of urbanization and associated industrialization has become a key challenge for China to realize carbon emission peaking targets on schedule. Therefore, understanding the characteristics of China’s urbanization process, clarifying the impacts of various factors related to economic structural change on the evolution trend of carbon emissions, and identifying the carbon reduction pathway coupled with economic growth can provide prominent decision references to optimize carbon reduction policy and realize carbon emission peaking. To investigate the complex impact of urbanization on carbon emissions, this paper measures the urbanization level from two perspectives of population urbanization rate and urbanization pace, and then introduce the urbanization level as the background variable into the STIRPAT model to constructure a latent class model. Based on the above model, we discuss the dynamic impacts of urbanization and other key determinants on carbon emissions. Moreover, we design four kinds of urbanization backgrounds and three simulation scenarios to analyze the feasible pathway for peaking carbon emissions in China by employing the Monte Carlo simulation method.

The results show that GDP per capita, population density, energy intensity, and energy consumption structure have signifi cant promoting effects on carbon emissions, indicating that China’s current economic growth pattern is still energy intensive in general. From a dynamic perspective, the promoting effects of some determinants on carbon emissions tend to be weak with the improvement of urbanization level. In detail, the promoting effects of population density and energy consumption structure gradually decrease during the process of urbanization. Besides, the increase in the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP can promote carbon emissions in regions with lower urbanization level, but suppress carbon emissions in most areas with higher urbanization levels. Moreover, only in regions with lower urbanization level, the increase in proportion of secondary industry results in more carbon emissions. The results of the scenario analysis demonstrate that under the historical benchmark scenario and the policy-oriented scenario, it is diffi cult for China to peak carbon emissions before 2030. In the context of technological breakthrough scenario and four kinds of urbanization evolution, China can peak carbon emissions at different time before 2030 with diffi cult peaking values. In addition, under the background of different levels of urbanization, there are apparent differences among the peaking pathways of carbon emissions. Specifi cally, China is more likely to peak carbon emissions under the higher urbanization level and the urbanization mode of “slow fi rst and then urgent”. Based on our fi ndings, it is suggested that a stable urbanization development strategy should be formulated, and the government should be committed to improving the low-carbon technological innovation capacity, to achieve the carbon emission peaking target as scheduled.

The contributions of this paper are as follows. First, the urbanization level is introduced as the background variable into the latent class model aiming at revealing carbon emission determinants, which can overcome the logical defect of general regression model in identifying the impact of urbanization on carbon emissions. Thus, this paper contributes to a better understanding of the impacts of urbanization on carbon emissions. Meanwhile, the model we construct can be used for reference to explore the real infl uence of various factors with background characteristics on the explained variable. Second, based on the scenario simulation analysis, this paper has a deep insight into the evolution tracks of carbon emissions under different economic and environmental policies and urbanization stages, thereby presenting the priorities of carbon reduction policy and the optimal carbon emission peaking pathway. Consequently, this paper could provide important theoretical basis and practical references for reasonable formulation and effective implementation of China’s carbon reduction policy.

 The "China's economic miracle" under the leadership of the Communist Party of China has always been an important topic of academic research at home and abroad, and it is the centralized embodiment and significant practical innovation of the modernization of the economic governance capacity of the Communist Party of China. Many studies have explored the causes of "China's economic miracle" from the aspects of political system, economic system, fiscal and tax system or cultural factors. The Communist Party of China has formed an efficient leadership system and governance model through continuous exploration in long-term practice.To understand the great achievements of contemporary China's economic development, it is necessary to deeply investigate the unique governance system under the leadership of the Communist Party of China. In view of this, under the framework of longitudinal governance between central and local governments, this paper summarizes the economic governance model with "target responsibility system" as the main feature, aiming to provide a new perspective for understanding "China's economic miracle".

First of all, this paper summarizes the concept and structural characteristics of "target responsibility system". "Target responsibility system" is a system which takes party and government branch organization as operation carrier and upholds the principle of equality of power and responsibility and benefit, the central government acts as the originator of the "downward decomposition" of economic and social goals, then local governments and social institutions at all levels decompose and implement the goals as the "upward responsible" contractors under administrative constraints, political or economic incentives, finally coordinate and unified to complete the targets of the system. In the system of "target responsibility", the relationship between the central government and the local government is "contract-contracting", which includes not only the top-down "constraint" effect, but also the bottom-up "incentive" feature. From the point of view of structure characteristics, the responsibility system of objectives can be divided into three main steps: setting objectives, decomposing objectives and assessing objectives. The steps of goal making, goal decomposition and goal assessment are not only gradient and gradual, but also interactive, thus forming a coordinated and unified closed loop system.

Secondly, from the perspectives of democratic centralism, Chinese-style decentralization, vertical governance system and socialist market economy, this paper analyzes the institutional basis of the effective operation of "target responsibility system" under Chinese model. First, the political foundation of democratic centralism determines the binding nature of target responsibility system. Democratic centralism ensures that the overall objectives of the central government are extended locally in a highly organized form wbhich has significant vertical constraints on local government. Second, "top-down" vertical governance ensures the cohesion of the target accountability system. Top-down performance appraisal motivates local governments to take on the central government's targets. Third, the fiscal incentive under economic decentralization strengthens the effectiveness of target responsibility system. The tax-sharing reform fully aroused the enthusiasm of local government to carry out local economic construction. Fourth, the socialist market economy system with Chinese characteristics has stimulated the creativity of target responsibility system. China's market economy system in which public ownership plays a dominant role and various forms of ownership develop side by side not only ensures that the goals set by the central and local governments can effectively play a leading role, but also gives full play to the initiative of various market entities.

Finally, this paper further analyzes the main mechanism of local government promoting economic growth through "self-motivation effect" and "yardstick competition effect" in the "top-down" target-responsibility management system. Under the vertical constraint led by the central government's target, the economic growth target is closely related to the assessment and promotion of officials. This pressure assessment system increases the government departments' pursuit of economic growth target and strengthens the "self-motivation" of local officials. In addition, competition among local governments is an important source of China's economic growth miracle. Local officials will spare no effort in economic construction and pursue higher economic growth rates in order to win the promotion tournament. Therefore, the pattern of regional horizontal competition formed under the target responsibility system not only ensures the effectiveness of the "downward decomposition" of the target, but also ensures the completion of the economic growth target.

This study provides a new idea for deepening the institutional reform of the governance relationship between central and local governments, and provides policy inspiration for the high-quality development of China's economy in the next step. First, scientific design of economic development objectives, give full play to the leading function of "target responsibility system". While the GDP-focused competition model of local officials has significantly boosted economic growth in past stages of development, it has also led to adverse effects such as overcapacity and redundant construction. Therefore, the central government should not only give full play to the overall function and leading role of "target responsibility system" when setting economic development goals, but also avoid the phenomenon of excessive overloading under the vertical management system. Second, we will promote the reform of the local government evaluation system and improve the evaluation index system. Regional performance will no longer be measured solely by GDP. Environmental protection, people's livelihood, culture and security will be taken into more comprehensive consideration, so that performance evaluation will not be based on total quantity, speed and scale, but on the quality, mode and sustainability of development. Third, we need to standardize the relationship between government revenue and expenditure at different levels and improve the governance mechanism between central and local governments. Since the tax-sharing reform, the divergence of financial resources and authority between central and local governments has intensified the function dislocation and behavior distortion of local governments. Therefore, it is necessary to speed up the construction of local tax system and enrich the revenue source of local government, and transfer part of expenditure responsibility appropriately. On this basis, the local government's intervention in market economic activities should be furtherly restricted, so as to reverse the distortion of local government's behavior under the central government-led incentive mode.